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Abstract 
Morally injurious events have been shown to increase the likelihood of experiencing 
anxiety, depressive, and posttraumatic stress symptoms of combat veterans. Research has 
found that guilt and shame are associated with higher levels of symptomology following 
morally injurious events. Similarly, individuals who are high in trait proneness to guilt 
and shame may be at higher risk for developing symptoms following a morally injurious 
event; however, no research to date has examined this possibility. In addition, acts that go 
against what one considers morally right bring about cognitive dissonance which then 
leads to anxiety. In order to reduce anxiety caused by this dissonance, one may disengage 
from one’s moral beliefs. Thus, combat veterans who have experienced morally injurious 
events may engage in moral disengagement in order to reduce the anxiety and distress 
that follow this dissonance. The present study investigated the relationship between 
morally injurious events and psychological outcomes and the role of proneness to guilt 
and shame and moral disengagement as potential moderators of the relationship between 
these events and psychological outcomes in post-9/11 combat veterans. Exposure to 
morally injurious events was significantly correlated with PTSD, depression, and anxiety. 
Neither moral disengagement nor proneness to shame and guilt moderated the 
relationship between exposure to morally injurious events and psychological outcomes.  
 Keywords: moral injury, moral disengagement, trauma, military, veterans  
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Introduction 
Research has indicated that many veterans of various armed conflicts, including 
the most recent wars, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, 
experience mental health problems upon returning from combat, including posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. About 44% of combat veterans reported 
that they experienced some problems adjusting after a deployment (Institute of Medicine 
[IOM], 2014b). Incidences of psychological diagnoses, especially PTSD, have increased 
substantially since the beginning of operations in the Middle East in 2001 (IOM, 2014b). 
Veterans have also been found to experience moral injury (Shay, 1994), a distressing 
biopsychosocial-spiritual reaction to experiences in combat that violate deeply held moral 
beliefs (Litz et al., 2009; Shay, 2014). Exposure to morally injurious events (MIEs) has 
been shown to be associated with anxiety (Nash et al., 2013), depression (Currier et al., 
2015; Yan, 2016), and posttraumatic stress (Nash et al., 2013; Yan, 2016). 
Litz et al. (2009) proposed that anxiety comes about after MIE exposure through 
the experience of shame and guilt. While shame and guilt could be conceptualized as 
normal and prosocial reactions, these feelings may be dangerous when connected to 
experiences in combat (Farnsworth et al., 2014), with the experience of shame and guilt 
in veterans being associated with higher risk for suicidal ideation (Bryan et al., 2013). 
While shame and guilt are outcome factors inherent in the moral injury model proposed 
by Litz et al. (2009), proneness to shame and guilt as a personality construct may increase 
risk of developing moral injury after exposure to MIEs, increasing the risk of developing 
other mental health problems. Conversely, moral disengagement, the reappraisal of a 
morally incongruous activity to avoid distressing affect and self-condemning cognitions, 
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may reduce distress in response to a violation of what one considers morally right. The 
present study examined the relationship between exposure to MIEs and anxiety, 
depressive, and PTSD symptoms. In addition, it examined the moderating effect of 
proneness to shame and guilt and moral disengagement in the relationship between MIEs 
and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms.  
The Military Experience 
Combat Experience 
 Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, 
President George Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism, eventually resulting in the 
United States (U.S.) occupation in Afghanistan, called Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), in October 2001 (Torreon, 2017). Following this came increased tension with 
nation states that harbored terrorists and had the potential for nuclear warfare. This 
tension resulted in conflict with Iraq, which led to a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, called 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in March 2003 (Torreon, 2017). These two operations 
started a new era of combat by U.S. forces, and members of the U.S. military were 
divided between deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq. In December 2014, combat 
operations in Afghanistan stopped, marking the end of OEF and the beginning of 
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) to rebuild and stabilize the government of 
Afghanistan (Torreon, 2017). Likewise, the combat operations in Iraq came to a close in 
December 2011, ushering in Operation New Dawn (OND) to stabilize and support the 
government of Iraq (Torreon, 2017). With the start of new armed conflicts in two main 
theatres of operations, with other operations throughout the globe, came an increase in 
combat-related mental health issues.  
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Prevalence of PTSD has risen in the veteran population since the beginning of the 
post-9/11 wars. The IOM (2014a) reported that 9.2% of the entire living veteran 
population has sought treatment for PTSD through the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(DVA), with 24% of those veterans who sought treatment having served in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. The IOM estimated that about 8% of all veterans and active duty service 
members have been diagnosed with PTSD due to combat experience. PTSD is a stress 
reaction from exposure to death, the threat of death or serious injury, or sexual violence, 
resulting in intrusive thoughts, avoidance of stimuli, negative cognitions, and alterations 
in arousal and reactivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). PTSD has become 
the more notable pathology affecting combat veterans, as it is the most researched and 
most treated mental illness through the DVA (2017). The DVA also reported veterans’ 
use of DVA services for depressive disorders, neurotic disorder, affective psychoses, 
drug and alcohol use disorders, sexual deviation disorders, and brain damage, with 
depressive and neurotic disorders being the second and third most diagnosed.  
Along with facing fears of death and injury caused by enemy combatants, service 
members in combat must also face other challenges, including killing or injuring others. 
It is hard to estimate how many enemy combatants were killed by U.S. forces throughout 
the most recent wars, though some estimates exist. For example, Crawford (2015) 
estimated that approximately 35,000 enemy combatants were killed in Afghanistan by 
U.S. and allied forces from the beginning of the conflict until 2015. This estimate was 
updated to about 42,000 in 2016, though Crawford (2016) speculated that this estimate 
likely included civilian noncombatants also killed by U.S. and allied forces. Iraq Body 
Count (2017) estimated that about 17,054 people (combatants, noncombatants, and 
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civilians) were killed by U.S. forces in Iraq. Based on these numbers, it would be 
estimated that about 59,000 enemy combatants were killed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan 
and Iraq since the beginning of the two conflicts. Because this type of experience is not 
seen in regular activities of life, adjustment to these experiences could bring about its 
own mental health issues that would be rarely seen outside of the military experience. 
Preparing for Combat 
After World War II, and during the Korean War, S.L.A. Marshall (1947) 
conducted a landmark study that looked at the firing rates of servicemembers in combat. 
He found that they would choose to not fire at the enemy as a way of preserving what 
they thought to be fundamentally right: not killing another person. His study consisted of 
group interviews in which he would ask the servicemembers after a combat experience 
about their firing rates. In a study conducted during the Vietnam War, Glenn (1987) 
found similar results that some soldiers chose to not fire their weapons and most soldiers 
reported at least once observing another soldier failing to fire while being engaged by the 
enemy. Grossman (2009) explained that later studies found that some soldiers, pressured 
to fire during engagements with the enemy, would fire over the heads of their enemy to 
preserve their moral agency by not killing another person. These studies and anecdotal 
evidence from three different wars demonstrate that servicemembers in combat still 
struggle to go against what they see as morally right, even with training and justification.  
When faced with a threat, the brain’s first reactions are either to fight, flee, or 
freeze. Grossman (2009) explained that an additional option in a fight would be to 
posture or submit. In combat, posturing would consist of making oneself seem as though 
they are a threat and instill fear in the opposition. When choosing not to fire, one may be 
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in a state of freeze, and when firing over the heads of the enemy, one may be in a state of 
posture (Grossman, 2009). In an attempt change the results of the S.L.A. Marshall (1947) 
study, the military changed some of the ways that servicemembers are trained to engage 
the enemy (Grossman, 2009). During the time of S.L.A. Marshall, soldiers were trained 
to fire using circle targets. After his results, the military found that they needed to train 
their service members to engage people rather than circles, in hopes that they would be 
desensitized to firing at another person. To do this, the military changed from circle 
targets to targets shaped like people, which supposedly increased rates of fire and 
enemies killed in action during the Vietnam War (Grossman, 2009).  
What does not appear to have been examined at that time, however, was the moral 
toll taken on the individual to be put into a position that goes against what they have 
learned to be morally right. S.L.A. Marshall (1947) identified the reason that 
servicemembers did not fire but did not examine the psychological consequences of 
killing in combat. Training evolved because they were able to identify the reason for 
nonaction during enemy engagement, introducing reflexive firing drills that rely on reflex 
rather than appraisal (Grossman, 2009). Shay (1994) discovered that veterans returning 
from Vietnam did not just suffer from PTSD from combat, but also had to make meaning 
of their actions and the actions of others that they perceived as going against what is 
morally right. While studies on World War II and the Korean War shed light on the 
reason why they would not fire at others, leading to a shift in training, the Vietnam War 
brought an increase in enemy engagement which allowed the use of this new training, 
shedding light on the consequences of violating the morals they were originally trying to 
protect by not firing.  
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Military Orders 
A unique factor of the military is the obligation to follow orders of those of higher 
rank to the individual. When entering the military, individuals take an oath that includes 
the line, “I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the 
officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice” (Title 10, 2020). The oath reads that one must follow orders that are in 
accordance with official regulation and legal guidelines according to the Uniformed Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ). This would also establish that orders must be legal and only 
legal orders are to be followed, referred to as a Lawful Order (Joint Service Committee 
on Military Justice, 2019). This may also mean that one must appraise the orders that are 
given to ensure lawfulness while also appraising the morality involved in one’s actions. 
With this, the instilled discipline of following orders combined with the fast pace of 
combat may bring an individual to follow orders without appraisal of the legality or 
morality that the orders may violate. This can bring challenges for the individual who 
follows the order if the order is later appraised as being morally or legally wrong. Shay 
(1994) noted that servicemembers, based on the above, must trust that their leadership are 
providing orders that are legal and ethical and are following a moral code, as violations of 
this could bring about psychological distress.      
Moral Injury 
The definition of moral injury has changed over time from Shay’s (1994) original 
conceptualization of a psychological reaction to violations of “what is right” by the 
individual’s leadership. Shay later refined his definition stating moral injury is present (1) 
when “there has been a betrayal of what’s right (2) by someone who holds a legitimate 
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authority (3) in a high stakes situation” (p. 183). Litz et al. (2009) expanded the definition 
of moral injury as  
the lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, and social impact of 
 exposure to an act of transgression that severely and abruptly contradicts an 
 individual’s personal or shared expectation about the rules or the code of conduct, 
 either during the event or at some point afterwards. (p. 700)  
This definition also added to the types of events that can be considered transgressive to 
one’s morality as “an act of wrongdoing, failing to prevent serious unethical behavior, or 
witnessing or learning about such an event” (p. 700), differing from Shay’s (1994, 2014) 
definition that saw moral injury as only occurring when one’s morality is violated by a 
person in power. Drescher et al. (2011), in a qualitative study with mental health 
providers, added to the definition proposed by Litz et al. (2009) regarding the actions that 
lead to a moral injury as those that are “inhumane, cruel, depraved, or violent, bringing 
about pain, suffering, or death of others” (p. 9). Drescher et al. concluded that there are 
problems with the definition, including problems of clarity and problems with the 
definition being able to cover all that is included in a moral injury, based on clinician 
reporting.   
Stein et al. (2012), in a factor analysis of multiple types of military traumatic 
events including morally injurious events, delineated two types: transgressions by self 
and transgressions by others. Moral injury by self consists of transgressive acts of 
commission or omission by the individual, while moral injury by others consists of 
bearing witness or being the victim of a transgressive act committed by someone else. 
However, when studying the psychometric properties of the Moral Injury Event Scale 
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(MIES), Bryan et al. (2016) found that there are three factors involved in moral injury: 
moral injury by self, moral injury by others, and moral injury by betrayal. While Stein et 
al. (2012) included betrayal in moral injury by others, where the individual experiencing 
the moral injury is the victim of a transgressive act, Bryan et al. (2013) identified betrayal 
as a distinct category.  
The definitions of moral injury historically failed to differentiate between the 
actions from the outcome and mostly researched moral injury as being the act itself. In 
past research, what was considered moral injury is actually the transgressive act or 
morally injurious event (Farnsworth et al., 2017; Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016). Lancaster 
and Erbes (2017) and Frankfurt and Frazier (2016), on the other hand, argued that the 
psychological experience of these events should be included in the conceptualization of 
moral injury and therefore proposed that the definition of a moral injury should include 
both the perceived transgressive act as well as the associated psychological distress. 
Lancaster and Erbes thus defined a moral injury as involving “the experience of one of 
these events and then moral dissonance/conflict, which leads to negative emotions, 
psychological symptoms, and maladaptive behaviors” (p. 317).  
In sum, the construct of moral injury continues to evolve, and there has been some 
disagreement as to whether it should be defined as the morally injurious event only and 
what exactly constitutes such an event, or whether the resulting psychological distress 
should be included in the definition. For clarity, I will refer to the term morally injurious 
events as the main construct of interest for the present study, defined as acts of 
commission or omission (i.e., not preventing an action) by self or other in combat that go 
against one’s morality, as well as actions of the perceived abandonment or betrayal by 
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other individuals or the institution that is conceived as being immoral and inconsistent 
with moral beliefs learned through the military. Moral injury, then, is the overall 
construct that consists of both a morally injurious event (transgressive act) and a 
psychological reaction to that event (stimulus and response).  
Table 1 
 
Moral Injury Definitions 
 
Stimulus a Response Factorsb Reference 
Acts of wrongdoing or failing 
to prevent unethical behaviors 
 S, O, B (Litz et al, 2009) 
Betrayal of What is right by 
leadership 
 B (Shay, 2011) 
Inhumane actions that bring 
about pain and suffering 
 S, O (Drescher et al., 
2011) 
Committing, witnessing or 
being a victim of an act that is 
perceived to be a violation of 
moral or ethical standards 
 S, O, B (Stein et al., 2012) 
Witnessing/participating in 
warzone acts that challenge 
sense of humanity 
Erosion of global meaning 
systems 
S,O (Currier et al., 
2015) 
Acts of Omission, Commission 
or betrayal that transgress 
accepted behavioral 
boundaries and norms.   
Guilt and shame based syndrome 
consisting of PTSD symptoms, 
demoralization, self-
handicapping, and self-injury 
S, O. B (Frankfurt et al., 
2017) 
Transgressive act cited in 
Frankfurt and Frazier (2016) 
Negative emotions, 
psychological symptoms, 
maladaptive behavior 
S, O, B (Lancaster & 
Erbes, 2017) 
a. Morally Injurious Event/Transgressive act  
b. Factors: self (S), other (O), betrayal (B) 
Moral Development  
 To fully understand what constitutes moral injury, it is important to understand 
moral development and how one comes to hold certain views on what is considered right. 
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The understanding of what is right and what constitutes a moral action is developed 
through life and is brought into the military by individual members. Kohlberg (2008) 
identified three levels of moral development, with two types of value orientation in each 
level. This model shows that a child learns morality through their interactions with 
caregivers and moves from obedience of their caregivers’ rules to a more autonomous 
understanding of what would be considered right and what would be considered wrong. 
A child progresses through these levels from lower to higher levels of moral reasoning. 
Once the higher level is achieved, moral decision making may be situationally based, but 
higher levels of reasoning are maintained through life (Kohlberg, 1975). This means that, 
though an individual may make a “poor” moral decision in life based on circumstances, 
one’s higher-level thoughts, with regards to moral decision making, are still intact. 
Kohlberg (1975, 2008) developed his model based on cognitive development, though he 
pointed out that intelligence is not correlated to moral reasoning.  
Morality in the Military 
 The construct of morality within the military and in war may seem to differ from 
the construct outside of the military. Outside of the military and outside of combat, taking 
another life may be seen as immoral, whereas in military combat, taking a life can be 
seen as justified and necessary. However, there are instances in war where taking a life 
can no longer be considered moral, such as going against the established laws that govern 
combat (established by the military service, the government, and international law).  
The military itself has its own moral code that is expected to be adhered to by those who 
serve (Shay, 1994). Within that moral code is duty and service, which members of the 
military are expected to hold first above everything else (Cook, 2000). Duty and service 
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is the obligation to one’s comrades as well as the obligation to fulfill one’s 
responsibilities.  
Leadership is expected to protect their subordinates and adhere to their own moral 
code while in combat (Shay, 1994). Shay (1994) also explained that fairness in combat 
includes protecting subordinates. Fairness, in this sense is ensuring that the distribution of 
exposure to combat is even among those in the unit, such that each member of the unit is 
guaranteed to be equally exposed to combat, rather than shielding a select few. Fairness, 
in this case, becomes a part of the distinct moral code within the military.  
Individual and Collective Morality 
As stated, an individual develops a sense of moral agency throughout life. They 
also learn to adapt to the moral beliefs of the military upon entry. Both of these sets of 
moral beliefs can come into conflict when in combat. Killing an enemy combatant can 
come into conflict with a moral belief that killing another person is wrong, even though it 
may be seen as acceptable and necessary within the context of combat. Cook (2000) 
explained that there is a tension between higher moral codes (moral codes that are seen as 
derived from a religious code) that service members bring into the military and the 
military moral code. Service members are expected to follow specific laws of war that 
govern when killing is acceptable. This, in turn, is its own moral code with expected 
adherence with exemptions for when killing is considered morally acceptable.  
Shay’s (1994) original definition of moral injury emphasized that a moral injury 
could only come about when leadership betrays the individual. This definition views the 
betrayal as transgressing moral beliefs and as contradicting what one considers to be right 
based on military moral code which emphasizes loyalty among comrades. This definition, 
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however, does not cover the possible transgression of moral beliefs that one may 
encounter in combat because individuals enter the military with an already developed 
sense of morality. Later models take this into consideration and define the possible 
transgressive act as acts of omission or commission by the individual that go against their 
already developed moral agency as well as what was developed within the military 
context. In betrayal, the leadership violates what one considers morally right against the 
individual (Shay, 1994) where in moral injury by self, the individual acts in ways that 
transgress moral beliefs.  
Battles et al. (2018) found that betrayal by leadership was associated with 
depression, PTSD symptoms, anxiety, and hazardous alcohol use. They hypothesized that 
the betrayal by leadership damaged their sense of membership within the organization, 
potentially bringing about psychological distress. They also found that both betrayal and 
exposure to atrocities had the most significant association with PTSD, depressive, and 
anxiety symptoms. Evans et al. (2018) proposed that when one is deeply aware of and 
connected to their personal values, they may experience relatively higher life satisfaction 
despite distress following exposure to moral violations by self than following moral 
violations by others. This may explain why those with greater exposure to morally 
injurious events by others and through betrayal showed in increase level of distress 
(Battles et al., 2018) and reported less life satisfaction (Evans et al., 2018). 
Cook (2000) and Shay (1994) both looked at the justification for the wars that are 
fought. A war that has no apparent reason would bring about feelings of violation of 
those morals. This is similar to what was found by Gibbons et al. (2013), where service-
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members in Iraq could not find meaning in the conflict, and this caused tension with their 
own morality.  
The conflict between the core morals of the individual service members and the 
morals of the military brings about some confusion as to what could cause a moral injury, 
with some seeing moral injury as only arising from the violation of moral codes in the 
context of the military (going only against the military moral code) and some seeing it as 
a violation of either the military moral code or the moral code that was brought in from 
development (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016; Litz, 2009). It would appear, based on the 
above, that there are two separate moral codes, one of the military and one that is brought 
by the individual from their own development, which could bring about tension while 
serving in combat.  
Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s cognitions and beliefs do not match 
one’s actions. The result of dissonance is psychological discomfort motivating the 
individual to reduce dissonance through either avoidance of conflicting 
information/actions or through modifying cognitions in order to match actions or 
information that conflicts with beliefs (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019). This could be 
extended to holding moral beliefs and acting in a way that goes against those beliefs, 
resulting in cognitive dissonance. When one is not able to reduce the dissonance, this 
would result in distress.  
One way that cognitive dissonance can be reduced is through reappraisal of 
actions or beliefs to remove the inconsistency (Freiman, 2010). This could be done 
through justification of actions both while they are occurring or after the fact (Freiman, 
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2010). Reappraisal of one’s actions in order to justify going against cognitions and beliefs 
can reduce distress, referred to as moral disengagement.   
Moral Disengagement 
 Because the violation of one’s morality is hypothesized to result in psychological 
distress, it would follow that any action in combat that violates one’s moral beliefs would 
result in psychological distress. As this is not always the case and psychological reactions 
to actions in combat do not occur in every combat veteran, protective factors may buffer 
the reaction to going against established moral beliefs. In order to protect oneself from 
the self-condemnation of going against one’s own morality, Bandura (1999) proposed 
that people are able to disengage from their moral beliefs. To avoid self-censure, an 
individual is able to disengage from controls that regulate behavior that typically are 
guided by moral views by disengaging from their moral beliefs. Typically, when a person 
goes against what is right, in a moral sense, they then face the uncomfortable and 
distressing feeling of self-censure or self-devaluation (Bandura, 1999). In other words, 
they feel guilt or shame for violating what they consider to be morally right. In order to 
disengage from beliefs about what they consider to be right, to avoid that discomfort and 
distress, they must justify their actions, devalue or dehumanize the victims of their 
actions, minimize or ignore the consequences, justify why their actions were necessary, 
or displace the responsibility for their actions (Bandura, 1999). These forms of moral 
disengagement will be described in detail in this section.  
 Because higher level of thought regarding personal morality is still intact even 
after situationally going against one’s moral conviction (Kohlberg, 1975), one must 
appraise what has been done. In that period, justification of what has been done, like 
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identifying it as a “worthy” or just cause, can prevent feelings of self-censure for personal 
actions (Bandura, 1999). In this case, the individual would need to see their actions in 
combat as being justified in order to meet the greater good. For example, the service 
members may rely on the justification for the war in which they are fighting, which 
would, as stated before, rely on their identification with the reason for entering the 
conflict. If meaning can be made regarding the actions and the individual identifies with 
the justification of the conflict, they may be able to protect themselves from the 
psychological distress that could result.  
 Bandura (1999) has examined the language used within a conflict. In order to 
engage in behavior that is in violation of personally held beliefs, one may use words for 
one’s actions that take away the emotional impact of the actions. Rather than killing in 
combat, one may refer to one’s actions as “eliminating the enemy.” Language is thought 
to shape thought patterns, which make actions appear different to the individual 
(Bandura, 2002). This process is referred to as sanitizing language or euphemistic 
language. In sanitizing the language, the individual can also turn a violent activity, or one 
that violates their morality, into a socially positive action (Bandura, 2002).  
 Displacement of responsibility is placing the responsibility of one’s actions onto 
another. A service member, rather than seeing themselves being in violation of their own 
morality by killing in combat, may view themselves as mere followers of orders that have 
been given. This takes the responsibility off themselves (Bandura, 1999). Being ordered 
to commit atrocities, however, has been seen to bring about psychological distress in 
veterans, due to a feeling of betrayal by the authority (Shay, 1994). Though the 
subordinates can displace the responsibility of their actions onto the leaders that gave 
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orders, there may still be a reaction due to the perceived betrayal. Bandura (1999) 
explained that it takes true belief in the purpose of the institution, and the leadership 
therein, to be able to carry out ordered acts and displace this type of responsibility.  
Another means of moral disengagement is when a whole group is participating in 
an action, and therefore there is no personal responsibility that must be taken for the 
actions through diffusion of responsibility (Bandura, 1999). In a military context, actions 
in combat would be seen as the responsibility of the entire unit rather than an individual’s 
responsibility.  
Finally, dehumanizing the enemy takes the humane qualities away from the 
victim of one’s actions, making it easier to commit those actions (Bandura, 1999). In 
combat, viewing the enemy as though they are not human makes it easier to kill because 
one’s morality that would view killing a human as wrong is not violated. Dehumanizing 
terms have been used to equate the enemy to being less than human to make it easier to 
kill in combat. Nations and armies often make their enemy appear as less than human or 
even demonized in order to make it easier for the soldiers kill in combat because they are 
less likely to value the lives of the enemy (Bandura, 1999).  
Bandura (1999) has shown that government and agencies have used moral 
disengagement, either wittingly or unwittingly, to bring their actors to act in ways that 
violate held moral beliefs for the benefit of the agency. This is a malicious way in which 
moral disengagement has been applied in society. This may make it appear as though 
moral disengagement is inherently detrimental to society. This, however, negates the idea 
that moral disengagement may have utility in lives that are not intentionally malicious. It 
may be that, as a society, morality is held to be such an important aspect of society and 
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disengagement from morals is seen as inherently antisocial.  Shame and guilt following 
moral transgression is then seen as the primary prosocial reaction. 
In combat, soldiers are expected to act in ways that may, outside the context of 
military action, be viewed as transgressions of morality. This may include killing in 
combat. Though it may be justified in this context, the consequences of violating one’s 
morality may cause psychological distress, referred to as moral injury (Litz et al., 2009). 
To protect against the distress caused by such violations, the individual may morally 
disengage in order to protect themselves (Farnsworth et al., 2014). There is evidence that 
suggest that when this does not occur the soldier may experience distress. In fact, most 
soldiers will consciously or unconsciously choose inaction in combat rather than 
transgressing their moral beliefs (Grossman, 2009).   
Moral disengagement is used to reappraise actions committed by the individual in 
order to avoid feelings of discomfort associated with the action (Bandura, 1999). Shame 
and guilt are feelings of discomfort, but are seen as prosocial responses to going against 
what one learns as socially appropriate behavior (Young et al., 2016). Individuals learn 
through their development what is considered morally right and also learn to feel guilty if 
they go against what is considered right and are socialized to learn that doing wrong 
means that they are wrong, leading to feelings of shame (Kohlerg, 1975; Young et al., 
2016). Moral disengagement, then, is going against the social constraints of what one 
learns is right.   
Though it is often employed by the individual to avoid the discomfort of going 
against their moral beliefs in small ways, it can also have serious consequences to 
society. Bandura (1999), for instance, looked at how this led to atrocities being 
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committed and how governments used this appraisal in order to convince the people to 
disregard their moral beliefs. A problem with researching this phenomenon on such a 
large scale is that the events that incorporate moral disengagement are typically so large 
and so egregious that it becomes hard to research. It would also be difficult for some 
researchers to place their own values aside to research the phenomenon without bias. 
Likewise, cultural factors are not typically considered when it comes to researching this 
phenomenon.  
To minimize the uncomfortable feelings of self-censure from going against what 
one sees as morally wrong, one is able to disengage from one’s moral beliefs and 
participate in morally incongruous activities by dehumanizing one’s victims, minimizing 
or ignoring the consequences, justifying one’s actions, or displacing the responsibility. 
Moral disengagement minimizes the discomfort one may feel after having gone against 
one’s own moral beliefs.  
Shame and Guilt 
Shame can be defined as a feeling that there is something dishonorable in how a 
person acted in a particular circumstance (American Psychological Association, 2009). 
Similarly, guilt can be defined as distress over feeling that one has done something wrong 
(American Psychological Association, 2009). It would appear that these two definitions 
revolve around the concept of feelings relating to a past action. Because of their 
similarity, guilt and shame are typically combined in the literature as a single concept. 
Even as a combined definition of unpleasant feelings that one has done something wrong 
or dishonorable would match the subjective experience of a moral injury where the 
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individual feels unpleasantness resulting from past actions that could be deemed wrong or 
dishonorable.   
Guilt could be conceptualized as a prosocial response to tension in one’s past, but 
in military and combat veteran populations, guilt has been associated with poorer mental 
health outcomes (Farnsworth et al., 2014). Bryan et al. (2013) found that guilt and shame 
were higher for combat veterans who had a past history of suicidal ideations. The severity 
of suicidal ideations was correlated with ratings of guilt and shame independently. 
Kausch and Marks (2013) found in a case that some veterans’ guilt regarding their past 
actions in combat could also lead to a greater reaction to other instances of violence like 
news of a mass shooting. They found that veterans’  resonated more with these instances 
because of their own past moral transgressions. This would mean that guilt from a moral 
injury could have lingering effects that could also increase suffering related to moral 
injury (Kausch & Marks, 2013). This would make guilt associated with combat 
experience even more dangerous, as conceptualized by Farnsworth et al. (2014). 
Litz et al. (2009) proposed that guilt and shame would follow a morally injurious 
event. Frankfurt et al. (2017) found that guilt was significantly associated with 
transgressive acts, with the most reported transgressive act being killing in combat. They 
also found that guilt was a significant pathway between transgressive acts and suicidality. 
Lancaster (2017) found that state guilt and shame was a mediator between morally 
injurious events and PTSD and depressive symptoms.   
Yan (2016) found evidence that failure to integrate traumatic experiences with 
service-member’s moral framework led to poorer mental health outcomes. This failure to 
integrate may be due to guilt and shame related to that traumatic experience and not 
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allowing the veteran to forgive themselves. Litz et al. (2009) proposed that the failure to 
integrate morally injurious experiences with morals brings about feelings of guilt and 
shame over one’s actions, or lack thereof.  
Proneness to guilt and shame is a trait that may make an individual more likely to 
experience guilt and shame after a dissonance provoking event (Cohen et al., 2011). 
Cohen et al. (2011) described shame and guilt as moral emotions that occur after a 
transgression. The proneness to shame and guilt is the propensity one holds to experience 
such emotions after a transgression.  
 Litz et al. (2009) theorized that proneness to shame, being prone to view oneself 
as dishonorable for one’s actions, is a risk factor for psychological distress associated 
with a moral injury. Fergus et al. (2010) found that proneness to guilt and shame were 
predictors of symptom expression for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and social 
anxiety disorder (SAD) in a nonveteran sample. Young et al. (2016) found that proneness 
to shame and guilt was associated with development of depression based on situational 
factors. This would mean that a higher proneness to shame and guilt would influence the 
distress experienced when faced with life stressors. The proneness to shame and guilt 
then leads to the experience of shame and guilt following a morally injurious event which 
may lead to an inability to forgive oneself for what occurred and therefore greater 
distress. No studies have been published to date examining whether proneness to shame 
and guilt affects the relationship between morally injurious events and psychological 
outcomes.  
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Moral Injury and Mental Health 
PTSD and Depression 
Studies have investigated the association between moral injury and mental health 
outcomes, specifically depression and PTSD (Currier et al., 2015; Nash et al., 2013; Yan, 
2016). Currier et al. (2015) found a positive correlation between moral injury as 
determined by the Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIS-Q) and PTSD (r 
= .376) and depressive symptoms (r = .306, n = 131). Nash et al. (2013) found a positive 
correlation between moral injury and PTSD symptoms (r = .28) and depressive 
symptoms (r = .40, n = 533). Evans et al. (2017) found a correlation between moral 
injury and PTSD (r = 206) and depression (r = .125, n = 200), and Lancaster (2017) 
found a positive correlation between moral injury and depression (r = .33) and PTSD (r = 
.53, n = 161). The three latter studies utilized the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES). 
Likewise, Yan (2016) found a significant association between morally injurious events 
and both depressive symptoms and PTSD symptoms, and found that PTSD and 
depression symptoms are affected by moral injury.   
A morally injurious event may fall into what is considered a Criterion A event 
when it threatens the individual’s life or serious injury, when they observe someone being 
killed or seriously injured, or when they learn of someone close to them being killed or 
seriously injured (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Because many forms of 
morally injurious events include some sort of Criterion A event, it would follow that 
PTSD would also affect the individual. When the criteria for PTSD are met and the 
Criterion A event is one that deeply transgresses what one considers to be morally right, 
the individual may be considered having moral injury based PTSD (Held et al., 2017).  
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Though there is a correlation between moral injury and PTSD, the correlation is 
based on the correlation between experiencing a morally injurious event and the 
experience of PTSD after the event. It is likely that, like PTSD, there are those who do 
not experience psychological distress following the traumatic event, to the extent of 
PTSD, or who were able to recover from the traumatic experience. Also, the measures 
used only measured the extent to which one has experienced a morally injurious event, 
essentially only measuring Criterion A events when comparing it to the commonly used 
measures of PTSD.  
Battles at al. (2018) found that, though moral injury mediated the relationship 
between morally injurious events and PTSD symptoms, moral injury was not found to be 
directly associated to poorer mental health outcomes, though PTSD was. They viewed 
moral injury as being completely separate from PTSD, though it mediated the 
relationship.  
Table 2 
  
PTSD and Moral Injury Correlations 
 
MI Scale 
PTSD 
Scale r n Reference 
MIES PCL-S .28 2610 (Nash et al., 2013) 
MIS-Q PCL-C .376 131 (Currier et al., 2015) 
MIES PCL-C .206 200 (Evans et al., 2017) 
MIES PCL-5 .53 161 (Lancaster, 2017) 
MISS-M PCL-5 .56 427 (Koenig, 2018) 
MIQ-M PCL-5 .72 244 (Battles et al., 2018) 
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Anxiety 
Litz et al. (2009) hypothesized that a morally injurious event can lead to anxiety. 
Few studies, however, have looked at a direct correlation between anxiety and moral 
injury. Nash et al. (2013) found a positive correlation (r = 0.28, n = 533) between anxiety 
and moral injury and Evans et al. (2017) found similar results in a smaller sample (r = 
.221, n = 200). Evans et al. found that greater exposure to potentially morally injurious 
events, as measured by the Moral Injury Events Scale, was associated with increased 
anxiety (p < .001, n = 200). Litz et al. theorized that rumination of the morally injurious 
experience leads to anxiety via shame and guilt, though no studies have directly 
investigated rumination in this context.  
Summary, Aims, and Hypotheses  
Self-reported morally injurious experiences by combat veterans have been 
associated with PTSD, anxiety, and depressive symptoms. Morally injurious events have 
also been associated with feelings of guilt and shame, while proneness to guilt and shame 
as a trait has been theorized to exacerbate the effects of these events on psychological 
distress (Litz et al., 2009). On the other hand, moral disengagement may serve as a 
protective factor from experiencing the distress associated with morally injurious events.  
While this makes sense from a conceptual standpoint, this has not yet been examined in 
empirical research.   
The aim of this research was to investigate the relationship between morally 
injurious events and psychological outcomes and the role of proneness to guilt and shame 
and moral disengagement as potential moderators of the relationship between morally 
injurious events and psychological outcomes in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF; Iraq)/ 
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Operation New Dawn (OND; Iraq)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; 
Afghanistan)/Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS; Afghanistan) Combat Veterans. It was 
hypothesized that morally injurious events would be associated with increased levels of 
anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Proneness to guilt and shame was 
hypothesized to be a moderator between morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, 
and PTSD symptoms such that those participants with high morally injurious events and 
higher proneness to guilt and shame were predicted to have the highest levels of anxiety, 
depressive, and PTSD symptoms, followed by those with high morally injurious events 
and low proneness to guilt and shame, while those with low morally injurious events 
were predicted to have the lowest levels of anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms, 
regardless of proneness to shame and guilt. Moral disengagement was hypothesized to 
buffer the association between morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and 
PTSD symptoms such that those with high morally injurious events and high moral 
disengagement would report lower anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms than those 
with low moral disengagement and high morally injurious events, while those with low 
morally injurious events would report lower anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms, 
regardless of moral disengagement. 
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Methods 
Participants 
 Based on a power analysis using a power of .80 and α = .05, and a medium effect 
size for a multiple regression analysis, a minimum of 76 participants were required and 
89 participants were recruited. Participants were included if they were post-9/11 combat 
veterans who have deployed to a combat zone between September 2011 and present. 
Participants were excluded if they are currently on active duty or are in transition from 
active duty. Twelve participants did not fully complete the survey, and no participants 
met exclusion criteria, resulting in a total of 77 participants.  
Measures 
Background Questionnaire 
 The participants completed a questionnaire to gather information on 
race/ethnicity, gender, marital status, employment, and highest level of education. 
Additionally, information on length of service, number of deployments, location and 
approximate dates of deployments, branch of service, current service status, and type of 
discharge were collected to ensure inclusion criteria were met. Participants were also 
asked if they are currently taking psychotropic medication, if they are currently attending 
psychotherapy, and the last time they attended psychotherapy.  
Moral Injury 
 The Moral Injury Event Scale (MIES) is comprised of nine questions divided into 
two factors, with the first factor measuring perceived transgressions committed by the 
individual or others and the second factor measuring perceived betrayal (Nash et al., 
2013). This provided data on transgressive acts of betrayal by the leadership as proposed 
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by Shay (1994) as well as data on individual commission or omission of wartime acts in 
accordance with the model proposed by Litz et al. (2009). The measure uses a 6-point 
Likert scale (1–Strongly agree, 2–Moderately agree, 3–Slightly agree, 4–Slightly 
disagree, 5–Moderately agree, 6–Strongly disagree). Respondents used this scale to 
identify agreement with statements made about their experiences in combat. Nash et al. 
(2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 for the entire measure (N = 1,039), indicating 
good internal consistency reliability for the original 11-item scale and a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .90 when only the first nine questions were used. Because of the increased reliability 
for the nine-item assessment, the last two questions were removed for the purpose of this 
study, as recommended by Nash et al. (2013).  Bryan et al. (2016) divided the scale into 
three factors—moral injury by self, moral injury by others, and moral injury by 
betrayal—with good internal reliability in two samples (N = 151 and 935). They reported 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .96 and .94 for moral injury by self (Questions 3-6), .79 in both 
samples for moral injury by others (Questions 1 and 2), and .83 and .89 for moral injury 
by betrayal (Questions 7-9).  
Moral Disengagement 
The Moral Disengagement Scale introduced by Jackson and Sparr (2005) is an 
eight-item assessment that measures the moral disengagement factors proposed by 
Bandura (1999), with one question for each factor (1–euphemistic labeling, 2–moral 
justification, 3–dehumanization, 4–diffusion of responsibility, 5–minimizing 
consequences, 6–displacement of responsibility, 7–palliative comparison, 8–attribution of 
blame; Jackson & Sparr, 2005). The measurement uses a 5-point Likert scale (1–Not true, 
2–A little true, 3–Middling true, 4–Quite true, 5–Very true) and respondents rate their 
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agreement with the given statement. Jackson and Sparr (2005) reported a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .86 for the assessment in one study and .81 for their second study, indicating 
good internal reliability. This assessment was chosen over other possibilities because of 
its direct relation to military activity such that it focuses on counterterrorism and 
necessity of force from military. It was also chosen because it was normed in an adult 
population and has good internal reliability. One problem with this specific assessment 
was that it was normed in an Austrian population. The measure was translated by Jackson 
and Sparr, but the psychometric properties of the English version are unknown.   
Anxiety 
 The Patient Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS) – 
Emotional Distress – Anxiety Short Form version 1.0 is an eight-item assessment of 
anxiety symptoms that have been experienced within the past 7 days. The measure uses a 
5-point Likert scale where the respondent rates the frequency of symptoms, from “never” 
to “always.” The PROMIS anxiety short form has good reliability with a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.968 for ages 21 through 49 and 0.971 for those age 50 through 64 in a diverse 
population (N = 10,740; Teresi et al., 2016a). This assessment was chosen because of its 
validity and reliability and because it was validated in paper form as well as 
electronically. Validation of the digital version of this assessment showed no differences 
in validity or reliability from the paper version (Bjorner et al., 2014). This makes it 
possible to convert the assessment into an online assessment without jeopardizing the 
validity of the assessment.  
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Depression 
The (PROMIS) – Emotional Distress – Depression Short Form version 1.0 is an 
eight-item assessment of depressive symptoms that have been experienced within the past 
7 days. The measure uses a 5-point Likert scale where the respondent rates the frequency 
of symptoms, from “never” to “always.” The PROMIS depression short form has good 
reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.969 for ages 21 through 49 and 0.969 for those 
age 50 through 64 in a diverse population (N = 5,000; Teresi et al., 2016b). This 
assessment was chosen because of its validity and reliability and because it was validated 
in paper form as well as electronically. Validation of the digital version of this 
assessment showed no differences in validity or reliability from the paper version 
(Bjorner et al., 2014). This makes it possible to convert the assessment into an online 
assessment without jeopardizing the validity of the assessment. 
Proneness to Shame and Guilt 
The Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) scale was used to measure the proneness 
to experiencing guilt and shame. In this measure, there are two indices, one for guilt and 
one for shame. The GASP is a 16-question, situationally-based scale that measures one’s 
propensity to feel guilt and shame in response to provided scenarios (Cohen et al., 2011). 
The measurement uses a 7-point Likert scale to rate the likeliness of their response to the 
given scenario (1–Very unlikely, 2–Unlikely, 3–Slightly likely, 4–About 50% likely, 5–
Slightly likely, 6–Likely, 7–Very likely). The GASP scale has an alpha coefficient of .60, 
indicating acceptable reliability.   
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PTSD Checklist – Military Version 
The PTSD Checklist – Military Version (PCL-M) was used to measure PTSD 
symptoms. The PCL-M is a 17-question, symptom-focused measure that uses a 5-point 
Likert scale to rate the severity of the symptoms. This scale was chosen over other PTSD 
scales because it has fewer questions on the measure and its validity and reliability in 
measuring PTSD symptoms. The PCL-M demonstrated good convergent validity when 
compared to similar measures of PTSD and had an internal consistency coefficient alpha 
of .96 for the full scale (Keen et al., 2008). The PCL-M was also found to have good 
diagnostic value for PTSD (Keen et al., 2008).  
Combat Exposure 
 The Combat Exposure Scale (CES) was used to measure the amount to which the 
participant has experienced combat situations. The CES is a seven-question assessment 
that uses a 5-point Likert scale to rate the extent to which one was exposed to combat. 
Questions 1 and 5–7 are rated based on the amount of times the participant was exposed 
(1–None/Never, 5–51+ Times), Question 2 is rated based on the number of months one 
was exposed, and Question 4 is based on the percentage of time one was exposed. The 
CES has a coefficient alpha of .85 and a test–retest reliability of .97 for a 1-week retest, 
both indicating good reliability for this measure (Keane et al., 1989).   
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Table 3 
 
Measures 
 
Construct Scale 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Reference 
Morally Injurious 
Events (Overall) 
Moral Injury Event Scale 
(MIES)  
.90 (Nash et al., 2013) 
Moral Injury from 
Self 
Moral Injury Event Scale 
(MIES) Factor 1 (Questions 
3–6) 
.94 (Bryan et al., 2016) 
Moral Injury from 
Other 
MIES Factor 2 (Questions 1–
2) 
.79 (Bryan et al., 2016) 
Moral Injury from 
Betrayal 
MIES Factor 3 (Questions 7–
9) 
.89 (Bryan et al., 2016) 
Anxiety PROMIS Emotional Distress 
– Anxiety – Short Form 8a 
.968 (Teresi et al., 2016a) 
Depression PROMIS Emotional Distress 
– Depression – Short Form 8a 
.969 (Teresi et al., 2016b) 
Moral Disengagement Moral Disengagement Scale .86 (Jackson & Sparr, 
2005) 
PTSD PTSD Checklist – Military 
Version (PCL-M) 
  
Proneness to Shame 
and Guilt 
Guilt and Shame Proneness 
(GASP) 
.60 (Cohen et al., 2011) 
Combat Exposure Combat Exposure Scale .85 (Keane et al., 1989) 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited online to take a survey. The measurements were 
converted into an online survey through surveymonkey.com. Recruitment was conducted 
through online communities for veterans and through Facebook posts. The survey was 
presented as a study looking at the respondent’s reactions to actions in combat, taking 
approximately 30 min to complete.  
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The survey began with an informed consent that stated that the title of the 
research was Predictors of Psychological Distress Following Experiences in Combat. 
The title was changed to mask the main study hypothesis and to reduce demand 
characteristics. The participants were then asked to take a survey that would be used to 
verify their veteran status. The survey consisted of three questions used by Lancaster and 
Erbes (2017). The participants needed to either correctly answer the questions provided 
or indicate that they are not a veteran. Indicating that they are not a veteran discontinued 
the survey. Correctly answering the questions verified veteran status. The measure was 
then presented in the following order: the demographics questionnaire, the PROMIS 
anxiety measurement, PROMIS depression measurement, PCL-M, the MIES, the Moral 
Disengagement Scale, and then the GASP. There were a total of 58 questions for this 
study. After the participants submitted their responses, they were taken to a document 
that they could download which  provided information regarding national and local 
services for veterans. The service referrals were focused on services that help veterans 
with combat-related trauma. A list of 24-hr crisis and suicide lines was also provided.  
Statistical Analysis 
 SPSS was used for statistical analysis. Distribution of all variables examined 
normality and outliers. A zero-order correlation table was then created for all main study 
variables (Table 3).  A Pearson r correlation was conducted to correlate the level of moral 
injury, as reported in the MIES to anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms to test the 
first hypothesis that moral injury is associated with increased anxiety, depressive, and 
PTSD symptoms.  
33 
 
To test the second hypothesis that proneness to shame and guilt will be a 
moderator between morally injurious experiences and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD 
symptoms, a multiple regression analysis was used. Proneness to shame and guilt and 
moral injury scores were entered in Step 1, followed by their cross product in Step 2, and 
anxiety, depression, and PTSD scores were entered as the dependent variables. To test the 
third hypothesis that moral disengagement buffers the relationship between morally 
injurious and anxiety, depressive and PTSD symptoms were tested using a multiple 
regression. Moral disengagement and moral injury were entered in Step 1, followed by 
the cross product in Step 2, and anxiety, depression, and PTSD were entered at the 
dependent variables.  
It was expected that proneness to shame and guilt and moral disengagement 
would moderate the relationship between moral injury and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD 
symptoms, with higher moral disengagement leading to lower anxiety, depression, and 
PTSD when moral injury is elevated and higher proneness to guilt and shame leading to 
higher anxiety, depression, and PTSD when moral injury is elevated. It was anticipated 
that proneness to shame and guilt and moral disengagement would be negatively 
correlated. Simple effects examined the nature of the interaction.  
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Results 
Sample Characteristics 
A total of 77 post-9/11 veterans completed the survey, 67.5% of whom identified 
as male and 28.8% of whom identified as female. This is an oversampling of females as 
the estimated percentage of the military is 15% female (ODASoD, 2014). This sample 
consisted of 16.3% African Americans, 10% Asian/Pacific Islander, 10% Hispanic/Latino 
(a/x), and 60% White. The mean age of this sample was 31 years and the mean total 
combat deployed months 18.5. This sample consisted of 34% Army, 21.3% Navy, 21.3% 
Air Force, and 11.3% Marines.  
A zero-order correlation was completed using a Pearson-r two-tailed correlation 
to examine the connection between each of the main study variables measured (Table 4).  
Table 4 
 
Mean, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations for All Measures 
 
 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Total MI 28.6(12.4) - 
 
        
2. MI-Self 8.5 (2.7) .725** -         
3. MI- Other 11.3(7.9) .942** .620** -        
4. MI- Betrayal 8.9(3.6) .812** .493** .659** -       
5. Moral 
Disengagement 
25.2(11.4) -.264* -.272* -.288* -.207 -      
6. GASP 74.9(8) .095 .047 .144 .042 .027 -     
7. Anxiety 18.9(10.7) .383** .234* .427** .286* -.665** .009 -    
8. Depression 18.8(10.7) .298** .182 .332** .235* -.657** .004 .948 -   
9. PTSD 47.6(10.7) .365** .203 .402** .279* -.612** -.012 .931 .892 -  
10. CES 16(4.3) .513** .318** .327** .201* .245* .032* .743** .683** .786** - 
MI=Moral Injury, scores from MIES (MI-Self=acts of commission or omission; MI-Other=Observing the act; MI-Betrayal=betrayal by the 
institution that goes against moral beliefs); CES=Combat Event Scale; GASP=Guilt and Shame Proneness; PTSD=Posttraumatic Stress disorder, 
scores from PTSD Checklist-5.  
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level 
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level  
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MIES and Psychological Outcomes 
Overall reporting of morally injurious events was positively correlated with 
anxiety (r = 0.388, p=0.001), depression (r = .298, p = 0.008), and PTSD (r = 0.368, p = 
0.001). Moral injury–self was positively correlated with anxiety (r = 0.243, p = 0.033) 
but no significant correlation was found between moral injury–self and depression and 
PTSD outcomes. Moral injury–others was positively correlated with anxiety (r = 0.427, p 
= 0.000), depression (r = 0.332, p = 0.003), and PTSD (r = 0.402, p = 0.000). Likewise, 
moral injury–betrayal was positively correlated with anxiety (r = 0.286, p = 0.012), 
depression (r = 0.235, p = 0.040), and PTSD (r = 0.279, p = 0.014). Moral injury–others 
showed the strongest correlation with negative psychological outcomes, with the weakest 
correlation between moral injury-self and negative outcomes. Overall, MIES was found 
to be positively correlated with each negative psychological outcome, supporting the first 
hypothesis that there is a correlation between MIES reporting and negative psychological 
outcomes. Interestingly, anxiety was found to be the only psychological outcome that was 
significantly correlated with each MIES factor.  
Shame and Guilt Proneness as a Moderator 
 Proneness to guilt and shame was hypothesized to be a moderator between 
morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Proneness to 
shame and guilt did not moderate the effect between MIEs and depression (r = -.0248, p 
= .0340), anxiety, (r = -.1081, p = .1554), or PTSD (r = -.0561, p = .1455). The second 
hypothesis of this study was rejected.  
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Figure 1 
Moderation Chart for Guilt and Shame Proneness, Moral Injury Exposure, and PTSD 
 
Figure 2 
Moderation Chart for Guilt and Shame Proneness, Moral Injury Exposure, and Anxiety 
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Figure 3 
Moderation Chart for Guilt and Shame Proneness, Moral Injury Exposure, and 
Depression 
 
 
Moral Disengagement as a Moderator 
 Moral disengagement was hypothesized to buffer the association between morally 
injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Moral disengagement did 
not moderate the relationship between moral injury and depression (r = -.0052, p = 
.4511), anxiety (r = -.0112, p=.0921), or PTSD (r = -.0273, p = .0629). This could be, in 
part, due to a ceiling effect with a high mean response on the MIES (M = 28.6, SD = 
12.4). Moral disengagement also had significant negative correlation between PTSD (r = 
-.612), depression (r = -.657), and anxiety (r = -.665) and a moderate negative 
correlation with moral injury (r = -.264).  
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Figure 4  
Moderation Chart for Moral Disengagement, Moral Injury Exposure, and PTSD 
 
Figure 5 
Moderation Chart for Moral Injury Exposure, Moral Disengagement, and Depression 
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Figure 6 
Moderation Chart for Moral Injury Exposure, Moral Disengagement, and Anxiety 
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Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between exposure to 
morally injurious events and PTSD, depression, and anxiety and the role of proneness to 
guilt and shame and moral disengagement as potential moderators of the relationship 
between morally injurious events and psychological outcomes. The first hypothesis was 
that exposure to morally injurious events would be correlated to increased reporting of 
anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Supporting previous studies and theories regarding moral 
injury outcomes, anxiety, depression, and PTSD were found to be positively correlated 
with experiencing a morally injurious event.   
Similar to Lancaster (2017), this study found a positive correlation between the 
PCL-5 and MIES. Previous studies with the MIES used the previous versions of the PCL 
(PCL-S, PCL-C) with a weaker correlation (Evans et al., 2017; Nash et al., 2013), 
possibly indicating a stronger correlation between the current measurement of PTSD and 
its relationship to exposure to MIEs.  
Proneness to guilt and shame was hypothesized to be a moderator between 
morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Proneness to guilt 
and shame did not appear to moderate the relationship between moral injury exposure 
and psychological outcomes, though proneness to shame and guilt was negatively 
correlated to psychological outcomes. The GASP was designed to assess multiple factors. 
These factors were not used for the purpose of this study, adding a limitation to its 
analysis. Future research could focus specifically on a multiple factor analysis of the 
relationship between proneness to shame and guilt, moral injury, and psychological 
outcomes.  
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Proneness to shame and guilt was not significantly correlated to any of the study 
variables. Previous studies have noted the importance of state shame and guilt as a 
mediator between MIEs and psychological outcomes (Litz et al., 2009), but have not 
examined how traits could moderate the outcomes. This study found that preexisting 
traits may not exacerbate the relationship between experiencing MIEs and psychological 
outcomes, despite previous literature suggesting the moderating value of shame and guilt 
after MIE exposure. This would indicate that shame and guilt results from MIE exposure. 
Similarly, it would not appear that MIEs alter one’s proneness to shame and guilt for 
experiences after MIEs.   
Moral disengagement was hypothesized to buffer the association between morally 
injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Moral disengagement did 
not appear to moderate the relationship between moral injury and psychological 
outcomes. Moral disengagement has been theorized to either enable a person to commit 
an act against their moral beliefs or assist in appraisal of actions after they have already 
been committed (Bandura, 2002). This study was not able to conclude if moral 
disengagement was increased due to appraisal or if it was present during MIE exposure. 
A dose-response effect could also explain that increased MIE exposure would limit the 
effect of moral disengagement as it pertains to appraisal of MIEs.  
Moral disengagement, however, had a strong relationship with each psychological 
outcome, indicating that moral disengagement, in and of itself, is a protective factor 
against psychological distress. Similar to previous studies (Farnsworth et al., 2014), 
moral disengagement appears to bring about some reduction in distress, with moral 
disengagement being negatively correlated with depression, anxiety, and PTSD. No 
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previous studies, however, have been found that measured this relationship directly. This 
study lends support to past research (Bandura, 2002) which found that moral 
disengagement can generally reduce distress; however, it was not found to specifically 
buffer the relationship between MIEs and distress.  
Moral injury was also found to be negatively correlated with moral 
disengagement. This could indicate alterations in belief patterns resulting from MIE 
exposure or appraising experiences differently due to moral disengagement, leading to 
differences in MIES responding. Evans et al. (2017) also noted that those with a higher 
connection or better understanding of their moral beliefs may have higher reporting on 
the MIES, which could also be the case for moral disengagement. This could mean that 
those who have more of a connection with their moral beliefs appraise these beliefs more, 
leading to lower reporting on moral disengagement with higher MIES reporting. No 
previous studies have examined the relationship between moral injury and moral 
disengagement. Future studies may look to further examine alterations in beliefs 
following moral injury.   
Limitations 
 Little research is currently available when it comes to the effects of moral injury. 
Several authors have proposed theoretical models for moral injury, but few studies have 
tested these models, like the one proposed by Lizt et al. (2009). This is both a strength 
and limitation of this study. While this study will add empirical data to the growing body 
of knowledge about moral injury, it is based on a theoretical construct that has limited 
testing. An additional complication comes from the different definitions of moral injury 
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confusion between action (transgressive act/morally injurious event) and reaction 
(psychological outcomes like anxiety, depression, and PTSD) in moral injury.  
 The cross-sectional design of this study likely impacted the validity of the results. 
The participants likely completed this survey with possibly a long period of time between 
their last deployment (and last experience in combat) and the time of this study. It is 
possible that participants may have undergone treatment that would have reduced the 
psychological impact of their actions in combat. It is also likely that this period of time 
could have impacted their moral disengagement because this construct has been found to 
be situationally based such that individuals may be morally disengaged when they 
commit the act but not in other situations or may only be morally disengaged due to the 
appraisal of that specific act (Bandura, 1999). No research has tested the effects of time 
on moral disengagement. Also, no study has tested the effects of time on moral injury. 
This study is also limited in concluding the direction of causality for the variables, such 
that the cause of PTSD, depressive, and anxiety symptoms may not be determined to 
originate from the transgressive act and could actually be caused by other factors such as 
general combat exposure.   
 PTSD is associated with problems with memory regarding the traumatic event. 
Posttraumatic amnesia may cause problems with remembering the details associated to 
events that may have transgressed moral beliefs. Alteration in mood, as caused by PTSD, 
may also bring about thinking that could come with overreporting by those with high 
PTSD scores. Likewise, alterations in worldview because of PTSD may bring about 
overreporting in moral disengagement and possibly underreporting on the GASP when it 
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comes to views of self, others, and the world. This may be particularly problematic with 
the moral disengagement rating.  
Future Directions 
 Future studies should examine moral disengagement and symptoms prior to 
deployment as well as after deployment to examine the relationship between 
experiencing the deployment and increases in moral disengagement. It is likely that this 
construct could change based on experience and a cross-sectional design study may not 
fully capture the effect that moral disengagement has on outcomes. Many participants in 
this study scored above the threshold for PTSD on the PCL-5. Future studies should also 
look at the relationship of these variables when PTSD is not present to examine moral 
injury as a construct separate from PTSD.  
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Appendix A 
Moral Injury Event Scale (Nash et al., 2013) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(6) 
Moderately 
Agree 
(5) 
Slightly 
Agree 
(4) 
Slightly 
Disagree 
(3) 
Moderately 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
1. I saw things 
that were 
morally wrong 
      
2. I am troubled 
by having 
witnessed 
others’ immoral 
acts 
      
3. I acted in 
ways that 
violated my 
own moral code 
or values 
      
4. I am troubled 
by having acted 
in ways that 
violated my 
own morals.  
      
5. I violated my 
own morals by 
failing to do 
something I felt 
I should have 
done 
      
6. I am troubled 
because I 
violated my 
morals by 
failing to do 
something that I 
felt I should 
have done.  
      
7. I felt betrayed 
by leaders who I 
once trusted 
      
8. I felt betrayed 
by fellow 
service 
      
54 
 
members who I 
once trusted 
9. I felt betrayed 
by others 
outside the U.S. 
Military who I 
once trusted 
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Appendix B 
PROMIS Emotional Distress – Anxiety – Short Form 8a 
In the past 7 days… Never 
(1) 
Rarely 
(2) 
Sometimes 
(3) 
Often 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
I felt fearful      
I found it hard to focus on anything 
other than my anxiety 
     
My worries overwhelmed me      
I felt uneasy      
I felt nervous      
I felt like I needed help for my anxiety      
I felt anxious      
I felt tense      
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Appendix C 
PROMIS Emotional Distress – Depression – Short Form 8a 
In the past 7 days… Never 
(1) 
Rarely 
(2) 
Sometimes 
(3) 
Often 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
I felt worthless      
I felt helpless      
I felt depressed      
I felt hopeless      
I felt like a failure      
I felt unhappy      
I felt that I had nothing to look 
forward to 
     
I felt that nothing could cheer me up      
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Appendix D 
Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen et al., 2011) 
 Very 
Unlikely 
(1) 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unlikely 
(3) 
About 
50% 
Likely 
(4) 
Slightly 
Likely 
(5) 
Likely 
(6) 
Very 
Likely 
(7) 
1. After realizing 
you have 
received too 
much change at a 
store, you decide 
to keep it because 
the salesclerk 
doesn’t notice. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
you would feel 
uncomfortable 
about keeping the 
money? 
       
2. You are 
privately 
informed that you 
are the only one 
in your group that 
did not make the 
honor society 
because you 
skipped too many 
days of school. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
this would lead 
you to become 
more responsible 
about attending 
school? 
       
3. You rip an 
article out of a 
journal in the 
library and take it 
with you. Your 
teacher discovers 
what you did and 
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tells the librarian 
and your entire 
class. What is the 
likelihood that 
this would make 
you would feel 
like a bad person? 
4. After making a 
big mistake on an 
important project 
at work in which 
people were 
depending on 
you, your boss 
criticizes you in 
front of your 
coworkers. What 
is the likelihood 
that you would 
feign sickness 
and leave work? 
       
5. You reveal a 
friend’s secret, 
though your 
friend never finds 
out. What is the 
likelihood that 
your failure to 
keep the secret 
would lead you to 
exert extra effort 
to keep secrets in 
the future? 
       
6. You give a bad 
presentation at 
work. Afterwards 
your boss tells 
your coworkers it 
was your fault 
that your 
company lost the 
contract. What is 
the likelihood 
that you would 
feel incompetent? 
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7. A friend tells 
you that you 
boast a great deal. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
you would stop 
spending time 
with that friend? 
       
8. Your home is 
very messy and 
unexpected 
guests knock on 
your door and 
invite themselves 
in. What is the 
likelihood that 
you would avoid 
the guests until 
they leave? 
       
9. You secretly 
commit a felony. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
you would feel 
remorse about 
breaking the law? 
       
10. You 
successfully 
exaggerate your 
damages in a 
lawsuit. Months 
later, your lies are 
discovered and 
you are charged 
with perjury. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
you would think 
you are a 
despicable human 
being? 
       
11. You strongly 
defend a point of 
view in a 
discussion, and 
though nobody 
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was aware of it, 
you realize that 
you were wrong. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
this would make 
you think more 
carefully before 
you speak? 
12. You take 
office supplies 
home for 
personal use and 
are caught by 
your boss. What 
is the likelihood 
that this would 
lead you to quit 
your job? 
       
13. You make a 
mistake at work 
and find out a 
coworker is 
blamed for the 
error. Later, your 
coworker 
confronts you 
about your 
mistake. What is 
the likelihood 
that you would 
feel like a 
coward? 
       
14. At a 
coworker’s 
housewarming 
party, you spill 
red wine on their 
new cream-
colored carpet. 
You cover the 
stain with a chair 
so that nobody 
notices your 
mess. What is the 
likelihood that 
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you would feel 
that the way you 
acted was 
pathetic? 
15. While 
discussing a 
heated subject 
with friends, you 
suddenly realize 
you are shouting 
though nobody 
seems to notice. 
What is the 
likelihood that 
you would try to 
act more 
considerately 
toward your 
friends? 
       
16. You lie to 
people but they 
never find out 
about it. What is 
the likelihood 
that you would 
feel terrible about 
the lies you told? 
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Appendix E 
Moral Disengagement Scale (Jackson & Sparr, 2005) 
 Not True 
(1) 
A Little 
True  
(2) 
Middling 
True 
 (3) 
Quite 
True  
(4) 
Very 
True  
(5) 
1. In fast and clean military actions 
central bases of hostile movements 
can be neutralized 
and collateral damage can be 
minimized 
     
2. It is irresponsible to renounce the 
use of military force if a contribution 
to world-peace can be made by it. 
     
3. Terrorists are like pests in 
cornfields – one has to approach them 
relentlessly 
     
4. If the NATO asks us for military 
help to end a conflict in a foreign 
country, I support the use of armed 
forces in the crisis region 
     
5. In the struggle for peace I find the 
use of military force justified if death 
of innocent people is avoided 
     
6. If a soldier kills someone while on 
duty, he acts on behalf of military 
orders and thus carries no personal 
responsibility for his action 
     
7. If peaceful means cannot resolve a 
conflict effectively, I support the use 
of military intervention 
     
8. If extreme political groups are 
guilty of cruel crimes against 
humanity and serious human rights 
violations, they have not deserved to 
be treated sparely 
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Appendix F 
PTSD Checklist – for DSM-5 
  
 Not at 
all (1) 
A Little 
Bit 
(2) 
Modera
tely 
 (3) 
Quite 
a bit  
(4) 
Extremely 
(5) 
1. Repeated, disturbing, and unwanted 
memories of the stressful experience?  
     
2. Repeated, disturbing dreams of the stressful 
experience?  
     
3. Suddenly feeling or acting as if the stressful 
experience were actually happening again (as if 
you were actually back there reliving it)?  
     
4. Feeling very upset when something reminded 
you of the stressful experience?  
     
5. Having strong physical reactions when 
something reminded you of the stressful 
experience (for example, heart pounding, trouble 
breathing, sweating)?  
     
6. Avoiding memories, thoughts, or feelings 
related to the stressful experience?  
     
7. Avoiding external reminders of the stressful 
experience (for example, people, places, 
conversations, activities, objects, or situations)?  
     
8. Trouble remembering important parts of the 
stressful experience?  
     
9. Having strong negative beliefs about yourself, 
other people, or the world (for example, having 
thoughts such as: I am bad, there is something 
seriously wrong with me, no one can be trusted, 
the world is completely dangerous)?  
     
10. Blaming yourself or someone else for the 
stressful experience or what happened after it?  
     
11. Having strong negative feelings such as fear, 
horror, anger, guilt, or shame?  
     
12. Loss of interest in activities that you used to 
enjoy?  
     
13. Feeling distant or cut off from other people?       
14. Trouble experiencing positive feelings (for 
example, being unable to feel happiness or have 
loving feelings for people close to you)?  
     
15. Irritable behavior, angry outbursts, or acting 
aggressively?  
     
16. Taking too many risks or doing things that 
could cause you harm?  
     
17. Being “super alert” or watchful or on guard?       
18. Feeling jumpy or easily startled?       
19. Having difficulty concentrating?       
20. Trouble falling or staying asleep?       
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Appendix G 
Veteran Verification Survey (S. L. Lancaster, personal communication,  
November 21, 2017) 
 
Please answer by typing in the box or selecting the alternative option. 
 
1. In which state is your military branch's academy located? 
 
Option 1: Text box for them to type. 
Option 2:  A box they can check that says "I am not a veteran." 
 
 
2. What is the acronym for the locations where final physicals are taken prior to shipping 
off for basic training? (4 letters) 
 
Option 1: Text box for them to type. 
Option 2:  A box they can check that says "I am not a veteran." 
 
3. What is the acronym for the generic term the military uses for various job fields? (3/4 
letters) 
 
Option 1: Text box for them to type. 
Option 2:  A box they can check that says "I am not a veteran." 
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Appendix H 
Combat Exposure Scale (Keane et al., 1989) 
Please check the number for the answer that best describes your experience. 
1) Did you ever go on combat patrols or have other dangerous duty? 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1-3 times 4-12 times 13-50 times 51+ times 
 
2) Were you ever under enemy fire? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never <1 month 1-3 months 4-6 months 7+ months 
 
3) Were you ever surrounded by the enemy? 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-25 times 26+ times 
 
4) What percentage of the soldiers in your unit were killed (KIA), wounded or missing in 
action (MIA)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
None 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76% or more 
 
5) How often did you fire rounds at the enemy? 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1-3 times 4-12 times 13-50 times 51+ times 
 
6) How often did you see someone hit by incoming or outgoing rounds? 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1-3 times 4-12 times 13-50 times 51+ times 
 
7) How often were you in danger of being injured or killed (i.e., being pinned down, 
overrun, ambushed, near miss, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1-3 times 4-12 times 13-50 times 51+ times 
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Appendix I 
Consent Form 
This study is being done by Aaron Keating who is a student at the Illinois School of Professional 
Psychology at National Louis University working on a Clinical Research Project. This study is a 
requirement to fulfill the researcher’s degree and will not be used for decision-making by any organization. 
 
The title of this study is Predictors of Distress Following Experiences in Combat. The purpose of this study 
is to investigate the nature of the relationship between experiences in combat and distress and 
various contributing factors in post-9/11 Combat Veterans. Up to 300 participants will be recruited 
for this study. I was asked to be in this study because I am a combat veteran that served in the combat 
theatre of both Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and present. If I agree to be in this study, I will be asked 
to answer a survey about my military and combat experience as well as my current feelings. My 
participation in this study will take between 30 and 45 minutes. The risks associated with this study are re-
exposure to memories associated with combat that I may consider uncomfortable, painful, or distressing. If 
at any time you need to speak to a mental health professional please contact your local Veteran’s Affairs or 
call the Veterans Crisis line at 1-800-273-8255 or text 838255 to speak to aa mental health professions. The 
information I provide will be treated confidentially, which means that nobody except Aaron M Keating will 
be able to link data to me. The records of this study will be kept private and will be retained for 3 years, 
after which, the data will be deleted from all storage devices. No words linking me to the study will be 
included in any sort of report that might be published. IP addresses will not be recorded. The records will 
be stored securely and only Aaron M Keating and Dr. Sandra Zakowski will have access to the records. I 
understand that my participation is strictly voluntary. If I do not participate, it will not harm my relationship 
with Aaron Keating or Argosy University. If I decide to participate, I can refuse to answer any of the 
questions that may make me uncomfortable. I can quit at any time without my relations with the university, 
job, benefits, etc., being affected. I can contact Aaron Keating at aaron.m.keating@stu.argosy.edu, with any 
questions about this study and may request a summary of the study’s results.  
 
I understand that this study has been reviewed and certified by the Institutional Review Board, National 
Louis University. For problems or questions regarding participants' rights, I can contact the Institutional 
Review Board at the National Louis University, 122 N Michigan Ave, Chicago, IL 60603. The board is 
chaired by Leah Horvath, lhorvath@nl.edu, (312) 777-7681.  
 
I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my 
satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this consent 
form. By signing this document, I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Name of Participant (printed) ____________________________________________  Date: ___________      
 
 If you agree, click here to sign and continue to survey 
 
Signature of Principal Investigator: ______________________    
Date: __________________ 
 
Aaron M Keating 
Principle Investigator 
National Louis University 
122 N Michigan Ave 
Chicago, IL 60603 
(719)360-8514  
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Appendix J 
Study Debriefing Form 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. This study is being done by Aaron Keating who is a 
student at the Illinois School of Professional Psychology at National Louis University-Chicago 
working on a Clinical Research Project. This study is a requirement to fulfill the researcher’s 
degree and will not be used for decision-making by any organization. 
 
The title of this study is Risk and Protective Factors for Psychological Distress Following a Moral 
Injurious Event in Combat Veterans. The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of 
the relationship between experiences in combat and distress and various contributing 
factors in Post-9/11 Combat Veterans. Up to 300 participants will be recruited for this study. 
 
The risks associated with this study are re-exposure to memories associated with combat that I 
may consider uncomfortable, painful, or distressing. If at any time you need to speak to a mental 
health professional please contact your local Veteran’s Affairs 
(https://www.va.gov/directory/guide/home.asp) or call the Veterans Crisis line at 1-800-273-8255 
or text 838255 to speak to a mental health professional.  
 
The information I provided will be treated confidentially, which means that nobody except Aaron 
M Keating will be able to link data to me. The records of this study will be kept private and will 
be retained for 3 years, after which, the data will be deleted from all storage devices. No words 
linking me to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published. IP addresses 
will not be recorded. The records will be stored securely and only Aaron M Keating and Dr. 
Sandra Zakowski will have access to the records.  
 
Please contact Aaron M Keating at akeating4@my.nl.edu, with any questions about this study 
and requests for a summary of the study’s results.  
 
Thank you again for your participation.  
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Appendix K 
Survey Advertisement 
Are you a Veteran that has deployed to Iraq or/and Afghanistan? 
Please consider filling out this survey about your combat experiences and the challenges 
you may have experienced after redeployment. This study seeks to look at experiences in 
combat to better understand combat experiences and their possible psychological 
consequences. This survey will take between 30 and 45 minutes and your responses will 
remain confidential. Your participation will contribute to our understanding of the effects 
that combat has on veterans.  
 
 
